The Wire
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Modi’s Somersault on Caste Census is a U-turn Fraught with Long-Term Challenges for the RSS-BJP
Seema Chishti
The Modi government’s approval of a caste-based census marks a dramatic shift for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological mentor, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which have historically resisted such enumeration.
It has conceded to forceful and consistent demands made by Lok Sabha leader of opposition and Congress MP Rahul Gandhi, often against the wishes of a section of his own party’s leadership.
Before the 2024 elections, Modi called a caste census a sign of the “urban Naxal” thinking of opposition parties – today he has become one himself.
This U-turn from Modi is not just a policy pivot but a significant departure from the foundational tenets of Hindutva ideology and the BJP-RSS’s longstanding stance on caste and social engineering.
At its core, Hindutva as articulated by the RSS and BJP aspires to unify Hindus under a single ethno-national identity, minimising and obliterating historical divisions such as caste. The ideology projects a vision of Hindu society where caste distinctions are either downplayed or ignored, aiming for a consolidated Hindu vote bank that transcends traditional social hierarchies.
Most recently, Uttar Pradesh chief minister Adityanath, one of the most virulent critics of social justice, coined “batenge to katenge”, (‘if divided, will be killed’), trying to misrepresent calls for representation and justice with division and even death.
The RSS and BJP have often positioned themselves as opponents of “vote-bank politics” based on caste, sparing no words and often using abuse to criticise opposition parties for allegedly ‘stoking caste-based divisions for electoral gain’.
L.K. Advani’s Ram Rath Yatra in 1990, which left a trail of blood in the wake of communal riots, was a response to the announcement of the implementation of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission by the V.P. Singh-led National Front government.
In the recent Maharashtra assembly elections, Modi was personally giving slogans like “Ek hain to safe hain”, trying to argue against Gandhi’s demand for a caste census.
After the Pahalgam terror attack, official BJP handles on social media were attacking those who ask for the enumeration of castes by equating them with terrorists asking for people’s religion. BJP Chhattisgarh’s X handle chose to insert the call for social justice in the moment.
Hindutva’s historical opposition
This resistance has been historical, even preceding India’s independence.
For decades, the BJP and RSS have resisted calls for a full-fledged caste census.
The BJP’s main concern has been that such an exercise would fracture the pan-Hindu identity they have carefully cultivated, especially in the politically sensitive states of north India, where caste loyalties run deep.
The fear was that enumerating castes would empower dominant other backward class (OBC) groups to demand greater political representation and resources, potentially undermining the upper-caste leadership that forms a core part of the BJP’s committed support base.
The RSS’s position has been slightly more nuanced but equally stringent: while it is not against welfare measures for some disadvantaged groups, it is staunchly against using caste enumeration as part of a drive for political empowerment.
The Hindutva organisation has repeatedly stated that caste is a sensitive issue and should not be exploited for electoral benefits, emphasising that any such exercise should be scientific and aimed solely at addressing disparities within Hindu society.
It is another matter that at least since 2013, Modi has himself never been shy of exploiting his own OBC identity and the BJP has been known to actively court and cultivate various caste groups during various elections in the past decade.
Modi’s U-turn
Despite this ideological resistance, the Modi government has now approved a caste census, a move seen as a political somersault under the pressure exerted by Gandhi.
The timing is critical: with the 2024 general elections concluded and the 2025 Bihar assembly elections approaching, the BJP faces mounting pressure from other opposition parties who have made social justice a central plank of their campaigns.
Regional parties and the Congress have intensified demands for a caste census. Telangana and Karnataka have done it, arguing that it is essential for refining welfare schemes and ensuring proportional representation for all communities.
By initiating the caste census, the BJP is hoping to preempt the opposition’s social justice narrative and retain its hold over the OBC vote, which has been pivotal to its recent electoral successes. This shift is an attempt by the party to control the framing and implementation of the census using the godi media, rather than conceding that Gandhi’s view has forced Modi’s hand.
This move, however, stands in stark contrast to the ‘unitary’ ethos of Hindutva. By officially counting castes, Modi risks reifying and politicising the very social divisions his ideological mentors have sought to erase under the banner of Hindu unity. It is a tacit admission that caste remains a powerful force in Indian society and politics, one that cannot be ignored or wished away by appeals to religious majoritarianism. Jaati hai ki jaatee hi nahi.
Moreover, the RSS’s cautious response, emphasising that the census should not become a political tool, reflects deep internal discomfort with this reversal.
It seems that Tuesday’s visit by the RSS chief to the prime minister’s official residence was about this U-turn and not about Pakistan or the delay in choosing the next BJP president.
The BJP’s embrace of caste enumeration is a pragmatic, not ideological, decision, driven by electoral compulsion rather than a genuine shift in worldview about caste oppression and social justice.
In sum, Modi’s decision to count caste represents a significant U-turn from the BJP-RSS’s historical stance and the core tenets of Hindutva ideology. It underscores the enduring power of caste in Indian politics and highlights the limits of majoritarian identity politics when confronted with demands for social justice and representation.
The move may yield Modi’s short-term political gains, but it also exposes the resentment that its loyal savarna caste base may feel.
Despite the BJP broadening its support base since 2014, the assured support that the privileged upper-caste offer to the party is crucial to it retaining a hegemony over the narrative in Indian politics, given an outsized savarna presence in the economy, media, social media and other institutions.
While allowing OBCs and others in the Hindutva umbrella may have got reluctant acceptance from this powerful though numerically smaller section after the 1990s, to concede to the inevitable demands of sharing the fruits of power that the caste census will lead to may be harder to swallow.
Also, just as trying to snatch Hindutva from the BJP’s playbook and adopt it has seldom yielded fruits for the opposition, will trying to wrest this key demand from the opposition, so much at odds with its own tenets, win the BJP support? Or will unleashing this genie of Mandal 3.0 only end up legitimising the opposition narrative and allow them to walk away with the trophy of public acceptance?
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In another article, As BJP Bows to Caste Census, How Will the Clash Between Social Justice Politics and Hindutva Play Out?, Zoya Hasan and Avishek Jha write (extract):
The (Modi Government’s) decision marks a major victory for the Congress party and the wider Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), which had centred their 2024 campaign around caste-based enumeration as a tool for social justice.
Rahul Gandhi’s embrace of a caste census began with the Bharat Jodo Yatra and intensified during the Bharat Jodo Nyay Yatra in 2024. He framed the demand as part of a broader quest for social and economic justice, often repeating: “Gine nahi jaoge toh sune nahi jaoge. Bahut hui vinti, ab INDIA karega ginti.”
His messaging resonated. Congress leaders adopted #GintiKaro in their social media bios, and the party’s most circulated campaign video focused on caste-based discrimination and data.
Rahul Gandhi’s speeches in parliament after becoming Lok Sabha leader of opposition kept the issue front and centre. Akhilesh Yadav of the Samajwadi Party and Tejashwi Yadav of the Rashtriya Janata Dal supported him, with Akhilesh coining the term PDA (pichhda, Dalit, alpsankhyak) to mobilise backwards, Dalits and minorities together.
The BJP, facing heat from this united front, shifted gears. With the 2024 election results showing a significant drop – from 303 to 240 seats – particularly in states with large OBC populations, the party needed to recapture the social justice narrative. Its decision to greenlight the caste census after years of public resistance reflects the electoral pressure exerted by a reinvigorated opposition.
For the RSS and BJP, which have long projected a vision of Hindu unity superseding caste identities, the caste census represents an ideological compromise. It also risks validating the opposition’s claim that caste-based inequality is foundational to Indian society, and that affirmative action must be expanded.
For Rahul Gandhi and the Congress, this moment is especially significant. The party, long dominated by upper-caste leaders, has historically struggled to build a backward-caste base. Many Congress leaders were lukewarm to the caste census idea; in Karnataka, the state government delayed publishing its caste report amid internal dissent. Yet Rahul Gandhi’s persistence has now positioned the Congress as a credible advocate for social justice.
(The BJP’s U-turn) opens the door for a new political era: one where the axis of competition shifts from religious polarisation to demands for equity and representation. If the opposition sustains its focus on caste justice, it could reshape national politics, fostering a broader democratisation of power.
The question remains: can the BJP and RSS control the political consequences of caste data once it is released? And will the Congress and its allies be able to institutionalise this momentum into long-term support from marginalised communities?
Either way, the Modi government’s approval of a caste census has ushered in a paradigm shift. What was once dismissed as divisive is now at the centre of national political discourse. The road ahead is uncertain – but its direction has unmistakably changed.
(Zoya Hasan is professor emerita with the Centre for Political Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Avishek Jha is a doctoral candidate at the University of Melbourne.)
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Pavan Korada writes in an article published in The Wire, A Look Back at India’s Caste Census Journey (extract):
The Union government, led by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), will count caste in the next national census, a decision announced after years of demands from political groups and social justice advocates. But it remains unclear when the census, already delayed from 2021, will happen.
Why has this demand gained force, and what is its story?
Why count caste?
Supporters argue that counting caste is essential for modern India – socially, legally, and administratively. They argue caste remains a powerful social reality, despite constitutional guarantees of equality. Caste still shapes life: marriage (inter-caste unions were rare, ~5% in 2011-12), surnames, where people live, and even political choices for candidates and appointments.
Surveys, though often dated or small-scale, consistently show socio-economic gaps linked to caste. For instance, 2011-12 National Sample Survey data showed ST, SC, and OBC households had significantly lower average spending than ‘General’ category households. Poverty estimates from the 2015-16 National Family Health Survey showed poverty concentrated among these groups: STs (50.6%), SCs (33.3%), and OBCs (27.2%), compared to 15.6% for others. Muslims also had higher poverty rates.
The inequalities extend to education and jobs. Official data shows the General category has far more graduates and workers in regular, salaried positions. Conversely, ST, SC, and OBC people are heavily overrepresented among casual labourers and in the large informal sector, often reflecting historical disadvantage.
Advocates also stress legal and administrative needs. India’s constitution allows affirmative action (reservations) for SCs, STs, and OBCs in government jobs, education (Articles 15(4) & 16(4)), and local elections (panchayats, municipalities (Articles 243D(6) & 243T(6)). Supporters argue that implementing these policies effectively requires accurate, current population data for each caste group.
The Supreme Court, notably in the 1992 Indra Sawhney case, stressed the need for data to manage reservations, identify backward groups, and exclude the OBC ‘creamy layer’. Lack of recent caste data has led courts in several states to halt OBC quotas in local elections. Reliable data is also seen as vital for possible sub-categories within the large OBC group, ensuring benefits reach the neediest, not just dominant groups. The government’s Justice Rohini Commission studied this, reporting in August 2023 after several extensions.
Ultimately, supporters argue counting caste makes hidden inequalities visible. They say it is needed to show the structural advantages of upper castes and the specific disadvantages of lower castes, laying groundwork for better social reforms. Some scholars argue official ‘caste blindness’ lets inequality and privilege persist unchallenged in a society still marked by caste.
A history of counting and forgetting caste
Counting caste isn’t new to India. British administrators counted caste in censuses from 1881 to 1931. Collected mainly for administration, the data revealed stark upper-caste dominance in society and government. This information empowered early lower-caste movements demanding fairer representation, leading to quotas in some regions. [In the above article by Zoya Hasan et al., they write: The last full-scale caste census occurred in 1931, identifying over 4,000 castes.]
But the nationalist movement, led mainly by Congress, grew wary of stressing caste divisions. Leaders feared it would fragment national unity against British rule, especially after the Muslim League mobilised Muslims separately. Efforts were made to downplay caste during census drives. Mahatma Gandhi strongly opposed separate electorates for Dalits (‘Depressed Classes’), fearing it would break Hindu society. This led to the Poona Pact of 1932. Critics like Phule, Periyar and Ambedkar worried independence might just transfer power from Britain to India’s upper-caste elites without ending caste oppression.
These fears seemed justified when, after independence in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru’s government stopped counting caste in the general census (starting 1951). The reason given: counting caste would perpetuate social divisions. An exception was made for SCs and STs, as the constitution required counting them for upliftment policies. Critics argue this decision had major consequences. It effectively reduced caste in public discussion mainly to Dalit untouchability, obscuring inequalities affecting many other lower castes (later called OBCs) and the advantages of upper castes.
The rise of OBC politics and the Mandal turning point
The constitution, however, required the state to identify and promote ‘socially and educationally backward classes’. This led to the 1953 Kalelkar Commission. Using the old 1931 census data (the only available), it identified thousands of backward castes. But its report was shelved, partly due to the chairman’s own reservations and the government’s reluctance to admit such widespread backwardness.
Despite this official hesitation, OBCs gained political importance, especially in southern states with long histories of backward caste movements. In North India, socialist Ram Manohar Lohia and agrarian leader Charan Singh mobilised OBCs, challenging Congress dominance. These trends merged in the Janata Party, an opposition coalition that defeated Indira Gandhi’s Congress in 1977. The Janata government appointed the Mandal Commission in 1978 to re-examine the condition of backward classes.
The Mandal Commission’s 1980 report was a turning point. Again relying on 1931 data (lacking newer figures), it controversially estimated OBCs made up 52% of India’s population. The report highlighted severe OBC under-representation in power, especially in central government jobs (under 13% OBC vs nearly 70% upper caste). It argued powerfully that reservation wasn’t just about easing poverty but ensuring a share of power for historically marginalised groups.
Based on its findings, but limited by a 50% Supreme Court cap on total reservations (SC/ST quotas were 22.5%), the commission recommended a 27% OBC quota in central government jobs and education.
When V.P. Singh’s government implemented this in 1990, fierce upper-caste protests erupted, calling it the ‘death of merit’. But the move also galvanised a pan-Indian OBC political identity. It permanently changed India’s politics, leading to powerful regional OBC parties and more OBCs in Parliament and state legislatures – what political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot called a ‘silent revolution’.
The mystery of the 2011 data
In 2011, the Congress-led UPA government, facing pressure, conducted a separate Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) alongside the main census. But the caste data from this massive exercise was never officially released.
The current NDA government later called this data ‘flawed’ and ‘unusable‘ in a 2021 Supreme Court affidavit.
Reasons given for withholding the SECC 2011 data involved methodology and execution. The government said the survey wasn’t done under the Census Act’s strict rules, but by ministries inexperienced in such large surveys. Crucially, it lacked a standard, pre-defined caste list and used open-ended questions. The government argued this led enumerators to record a confusing mix of caste names, sub-castes, clans and surnames interchangeably, creating an unusable count of distinct ‘castes’ (reportedly 4.6 million nationally, vs about 4,147 in 1931). Meaningful analysis was deemed impossible.
In the same affidavit, the Centre argued against counting caste in the next regular census. It cited major administrative, operational, and logistical challenges. These included complications from differing central and state OBC lists; the worry that briefly trained, part-time enumerators couldn’t verify complex caste identities (unlike clear SC/ST lists); and the fact that census plans are finalised years ahead.
The government also maintained that deciding what the census counts is a ‘policy decision’ courts cannot direct, noting no constitutional mandate exists to count OBCs (unlike SCs and STs). Opponents counter that social divisions existed before any census, counting SCs/STs hasn’t increased conflict, and sensitive data like religion is already collected. They add that reliable data would allow objective policy debate, not just fuel demands.
The BJP’s complex caste calculus
The ruling BJP’s rise, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, relied heavily on winning support from many Hindu OBC groups (BJP’s OBC vote share reportedly rose from 22% in 2009 to 44% in 2019). It often did this by opposing older OBC parties and stressing broader Hindu unity (‘Hindutva’), sometimes countering ‘Mandal’ (social justice) politics with ‘Kamandal’ (religious politics), seen in the Ram Mandir movement that grew alongside the Mandal debate.
Despite relying on OBC votes, the party keeps a strong upper-caste base. Its core ideology has been wary of caste politics, seeing it as potentially dividing the unified Hindu identity it promotes.
Though the BJP reportedly agreed before the 2019 election to count caste in the 2021 census, it later backtracked, citing complexities. The situation grew more complex with the 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) introduced in 2019. This quota mainly benefits upper castes (excluding those covered by SC/ST/OBC quotas). Significantly, it breached the long-held 50% reservation ceiling – a breach the Supreme Court upheld in 2022.
This fueled arguments from OBC groups to raise their own quotas above 27%, perhaps closer to their actual population share, making accurate data seem even more urgent. The long census delay also sparked speculation about the government’s motives: avoiding controversy over the planned National Population Register (NPR) update, or managing politics during India’s G20 presidency and before the 2024 elections.
State surveys increase the pressure
Frustrated by the Union government’s inaction on the 2011 data or a new caste count, several state governments launched their own surveys, greatly increasing political pressure.
In Bihar, the Nitish Kumar government released findings in 2023 showing OBCs (27%) and EBCs (36%) together constituted 63.13% of Bihar’s 13.07 crore population. The General category was 15.5%, SCs 19.65%, and STs 1.68%. The survey also highlighted economic distress (34.13% families earning ≤ ₹6,000/month) and low education levels (only 7% graduates). Methodologically, it used a predefined list of 214 castes plus an “Other” category, avoiding SECC 2011’s pitfalls.
The Congress government in Telangana, after its 2023 election win, conducted a caste survey ending in late 2024. It found BCs constitute 56.33% (including 10.08% BC Muslims), SCs 17.43%, STs 10.45%, and Other Castes 15.79% (including 2.48% OC Muslims) of the enumerated ~3.54 crore population.
This survey too faced controversies: questions about stagnant population figures compared to other estimates (SKS 2014, projections); allegations of undercounting, particularly in Hyderabad; and surveyor issues (subcontracting work). A major point of contention is the government’s reluctance to release granular data, citing “privacy” concerns, despite the Supreme Court’s view (in Bihar’s case) favouring transparency for scrutiny. The findings were used to inform policy, including fulfilling the promise to raise backward caste reservation in local bodies, education and employment to 42%, along with introducing sub-categorisation in the Scheduled Castes. The inclusion of Muslims as BCs faces opposition from the state BJP, contrasting with the national BJP’s outreach to Pasmanda Muslims.
In Karnataka, the Socio-Economic and Education Survey, commissioned by Siddaramaiah in 2015, was finally submitted in February 2024 and tabled in April 2024. It faced significant controversy, with dominant Lingayat and Vokkaliga communities questioning its methodology and findings, fearing diminished influence. Leaked details suggest it estimates OBCs at a staggering 69.6%, recommending an increase in their quota from 32% to 51%. It reportedly found Lingayat (13.6%) and Vokkaliga (12.2%) populations lower than commonly perceived estimates (17% and 15% respectively). It proposed a new Most Backward Classes (MBC) category (IB) with 12% quota, including Siddaramaiah’s Kuruba community, carved out from the existing IIA category (whose quota would reduce), sparking allegations of preferential treatment. The political sensitivity led to delays in Cabinet discussion and decision-making.
These state surveys, despite methods issues and controversies, undeniably pushed the demand for caste data into national politics, making it harder for the central government to ignore.
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Meanwhile, the Leader of the Opposition, Rahul Gandhi addressed a press conference after the Modi Government’s announcement that the caste census will soon be conducted. Sravasti Dasgupta reports, in an article published in The Wire – ‘We Want Dates’ Says Opposition as Modi Government Approves Caste Census in Sharp Reversal (extract):
Calling the caste census a ‘new paradigm of development’, Rahul Gandhi said the government must say when it will implement the census.
Hours after the Union government on Wednesday (April 30) announced that a caste census will be conducted along with the decadal census without providing any timeline for its rollout, leader of opposition in the Lok Sabha and Congress MP Rahul Gandhi said that the party welcomes the move as it has been a long-standing demand.
While the Modi government’s move is being seen in the light of the upcoming Bihar elections, Gandhi said that “it does not matter why” the decision has been taken and demanded a timeline from the government.
“I don’t think the Bihar election had played any role behind the decision,” Gandhi said while addressing a press conference in New Delhi.
“It does not matter why they took the decision. We have been fighting for very long [on the caste census]. We are happy. We welcome it. We want to ask the government by when the process will be completed. We want dates.”
Calling the caste census a “new paradigm of development”, Gandhi said that the Congress wants to go beyond the caste census.
“We’ve discussed two other key issues. Firstly, the 50% cap on reservations, which is increasingly becoming an impediment to development, the progress of our country and the advancement of backward castes, Dalits and Adivasis. We want this barrier to be eliminated. The third [sic] issue is, we demand the implementation of Article 15(5), which is reservations in private educational institutions. We urge the government to implement it promptly,” he said.
“We see the caste census as a new paradigm of development and we want to go beyond the caste census. We want to understand what the participation of 90% of our population is in the power structure of the country, where they are participating effectively and where they are not. We want to give them participation.
“We are convinced that a caste census is the first step in the new development paradigm in the country and we are going to push this paradigm.”
Gandhi added that the ‘Telangana model’ of conducting a caste census can be used as a blueprint for the national census and that the party can help the government in developing such a model.
(All articles, courtesy: The Wire, an Indian nonprofit news and opinion website. It was founded in 2015 by Siddharth Varadarajan, Sidharth Bhatia, and M. K. Venu.)